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Abstract: This paper argues that the structure of the mobile communications industry is 
being decisively affected by 'platformisation', yet in a present context of strong 'platform 
ambiguity'. It introduces the concept of gatekeeper roles to compare current mobile 
platform initiatives, and proposes a typology of platforms to characterise the various 
models encountered. 
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hile digital mobile communication arguably has constituted, in 
parallel with the Internet, the most impacting innovation of the past 
decades in terms of how people exchange information - and this first 
and foremost in Europe - its business and technological set-up is now facing 
profound change. Vertical coordination and integration have persisted in the 
mobile industry until very recently, with mobile telecom vendors driving and 
controlling technological innovation, and mobile network operators driving 
and controlling service provision (BOHLIN & BURGELMAN, 2004). 
However, the emergence of various types of software platforms and internet-
like end-to-end architectures in mobile systems is now increasing the 
pressure on the dominant technological and business set-up, to the point of 
a reconfiguration of the entire mobile system (BALLON, 2007a).  
The impact of this mobile-internet convergence for the structure of the 
mobile industry, and in particular for the position of mobile network operators 
as integrated service providers, has been a subject of heated debate for 
some time now. One particular stream of business and academic literature is 
arguing that the 'open and modular' internet architectures will (or should) 
wipe away the current 'closed and integrated' telecommunications 
architectures (see e.g. ZITTRAIN, 2008; JOAKAR & FISH, 2006). It is often 
implied that, as a result, (mainly US-based) internet and IT firms are bound 
to make significant inroads into the telecommunications market. By contrast, 
others anticipate that the advantages in terms of quality and security offered 
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by integrated telecommunications architectures will allow mobile operators to 
dominate the mobile internet and to capture a major share of all service 
revenues in this context (see e.g. KENNEDY, 2007).  
Recently, however, a small body of 'revisionist' literature on modularity 
and the ICT industry has emerged that, if applied to the mobile internet, may 
challenge both visions. It argues that there is no automatic mirroring 
between technical modularity and market unbundling, and that, instead of 
relying on any outright 'open' or 'closed' strategy, successful ICT companies 
increasingly employ 'open but not open' platform strategies in order to 
combine advantages of diversity and complementarity with advantages of 
control and coordination (see e.g. GAWER, 2009; ERNST, 2005). 
This paper will apply and extend this argument in the context of business 
models in the European mobile industry. Early 'new economy' approaches 
have defined a business model as simply "a way to make money" (see e.g. 
RAPPA, 2001), and have been subsequently criticised for their naive and 
de-contextualised mode of analysis (HAWKINS, 2003; PORTER, 2001). In 
response to this, a business model is increasingly seen as the way in which 
not just value streams, but also control architectures are configured within a 
network of firms (BALLON, 2007b). This approach refers to the tradition 
concerned with the political economy of ICT design, which stresses that 
control configurations, power relationships and different forms of bias 
pervade ICT design, and that they profoundly influence the outcome of the 
design in terms of individual, societal and economic value (MANSELL, 
1993). 
The aim of this paper is to verify whether platformisation is indeed 
affecting the mobile industry. In a context of strong uncertainty over what 
constitutes the central platform for mobile service provision, the paper will 
attempt to identify a set of core components that are common to all mobile 
platforms and to characterise the diversity of platform types encountered. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Following this introduction, it is 
outlined how the mobile communications industry is decisively affected by 
'platformisation', yet in a present context of strong 'interface ambiguity' or 
even 'platform ambiguity'. Subsequently, the concept of gatekeeper roles 
around which platforms are formed, is introduced. This concept is applied to 
the domain of mobile service provision. Through four industry cases, it is 
illustrated that the aim to control gatekeeper roles drives current platform 
strategies in the mobile industry. Finally, a platform typology is proposed 
based on a set of control parameters, and a number of conclusions are 
drawn. P. BALLON  17 
   The platformisation of mobile communications 
It could be argued that mobile telecommunications has been among the 
last domains of the ICT industry to resist, at least to some extent, technical, 
and thus a fortiori market, modularity. However, the increasing move 
towards a modular technical architecture, without ensuring any specific 
predetermined outcome, does create the conditions for further market 
unbundling and opens up a range of platform strategies.  
This can be illustrated by focusing on the segment of mobile service 
provision. The mobile telecommunications Operations Support Systems / 
Business Support Systems (OSS/BSS) frameworks that constitute an 
important part of the mobile system set-up, are increasingly being called into 
question by novel IT-oriented frameworks. OSS/BSS systems are usually 
proprietary and custom-built for specific operators and for specific 
applications. Typically, they follow the 'stovepipe model', in the sense that 
they are legacy services bought by the operator to solve specific problems, 
and that they tightly bind together access and core network management 
with central service management features (MARTIKAINEN, 2006). As the 
number of services and applications offered by mobile operators increased 
over the years, so did the amount of co-existing 'vertical' applications. This 
traditional approach has often been associated with the fragmentation and 
complexity of mobile operators' systems and with slow and expensive 
service launches in mobile markets. Also, the tight integration between 
applications and back-end systems, which traditionally forced the mobile 
industry to focus on a single 'killer application' that in itself should justify all 
investments associated with a new mobile generation, proved inept to the 
world of mobile data applications. It took the success of the Japanese i-
mode ecosystem model to make the killer 'business model' instead of the 
'killer application' the new primary concern for the mobile industry 
(LINDMARK et al., 2004). 
The Vodafone Live! model is the prime example of the resulting walled 
garden models, that involved a mobile portal, a micropayment system and a 
revenue sharing model, a distinction between 'official' and 'non-official' 
content providers, and a number of dedicated handsets (TEE, 2005). 
However, the fragmentation of most mobile markets, the inability or 
unwillingness to conclude cross-operator arrangements to benefit content 
providers and application developers, the laborious nature of concluding 
contracts and the revenue sharing models that were deemed not attractive 
enough, all conspired to limit the success of these (semi) walled garden 18     No. 75, 3
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models. While walled gardens relied on an externalised platform, it is clear 
that they constituted one-sided markets, in the sense that operators actively 
constrained the number of content and application providers, and strongly 
emphasised the integration of their services into an offering controlled and 
branded by the platform owner (EVANS et al., 2005). In sum, operators 
treated service developers as suppliers, whose number needed to be 
reduced and whose profit margins needed to be squeezed, instead of 
treating them as customers, whose numbers need to be maximised and 
whose ability to capture at least part of the value needs to be preserved. 
Consequently, the revenues from the services offered on the platform have 
remained at a disappointingly low level. 
Over the last few years, however, alternative frameworks have been 
proposed and implemented, whereby services and service components can 
be re-used in a more generic way, in order to ensure cheaper and faster new 
service and applications development, and to force the transition to a multi-
sided market. Frameworks such as IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) 
introduced a number of horizontal 'planes' on top of the network 'layer', 
containing several services and service components that can be used and 
re-used at will. IMS is generally regarded as a telecom operator-centric 
standard, as it enables the encapsulation and convergence of traditional, 
fixed and mobile circuit-switched communications into a packet-switched, IP-
based system, and as it enables the bundling and control of any service 
including voice, video, web browsing, email, and internet messaging in the 
form of chargeable and manageable data 'sessions'. Also, current operator 
platform's initiatives are using distinct APIs to give external, 'third party' 
service providers access to selected network resources, including the GSMA 
OneAPI and the OMA IMS APIs . 
This can be interpreted as a reply to a whole series of new service 
development and delivery environments that have been introduced by IT and 
handset vendors, and internet-based companies. They enable mobile 
applications to be built and distributed easily and often without the active 
involvement of the network operator. First of all, mobile operating systems 
such as Symbian, Windows Mobile, LiMo, Android and the Apple iPhone's 
OS X, that are running on high-end smartphones, are becoming increasingly 
powerful, and are supporting the development of 'third-party' applications, 
e.g. by releasing so-called software development kits (SDKs) and by setting 
up developer programmes. Secondly, a new range of web browsers are 
explicitly targeting the mobile phone and are starting to offer full support for 
the many developers familiar with 'fixed' web service development. As a 
prominent example, the SDK for the Opera browser has been designed P. BALLON  19 
specifically to support the use of AJAX-based Web technologies for mobile 
phones - AJAX being a set of technologies, including the JavaScript 
application-scripting language, designed to make webpages behave more 
like regular applications. This enables a more attractive and rich user 
experience, as well as the porting of hugely successful 'fixed internet' 
websites such as YouTube, Facebook and eBay, to the mobile environment. 
Thirdly, application portals and stores for mobile devices, such as Apple's 
App Store or Google's Android Market, offer the possibility of easy access 
to, and purchase of, lightweight applications on the mobile phone.  
It has been argued that all of these initiatives follow a platform leadership 
strategy, in the sense that they all attempt to establish a central system 
component and to structure the industry around this (BALLON, 2009; 
BALLON  et al., 2008). Commoditising potentially competing platforms, 
attracting large volumes of content/applications providers as well as end-
users, and gaining control over crucial customer-related data and 
relationships appear to be essential elements of the strategies employed. 
Also, both technological and market convergence are clearly observable in 
these instances, as competition in the mobile service provision domain is 
now taking place between strongly different competitors including mobile 
operators, telecom manufacturers, software vendors, internet-based 
companies, who are primarily focusing on wildly different artefacts such as 
mobile operator portals, smartphone manufacturers, a social networking 
website and a container APIs. For a European mobile industry anchored 
around the 'traditional' mobile operators and mobile vendors, which are now 
being challenged by often US-based IT and internet firms, this 
'platformisation' thus creates particularly strong challenges.  
Strikingly, all these 'platform wannabes' are attempting to obtain 
dominant positions related to service creation, execution and delivery, but 
they do so by exploiting very different network positions and core 
competencies. This indicates that 'traditional' modes of analysis of 
competing firms, strategies and/or business models, focusing on specific 
sectors, legacy configurations, specific 'layers' or parts of the value chain, 
are insufficient, and need to encompass a much wider range of 
stakeholders, technology and business configurations. The following 
sections will attempt to find a common ground for analysis of the different 
platform strategies by opening up the 'black box of platforms' and by 
focusing on the control configurations related to a number of crucial 
functions and roles. 20     No. 75, 3
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   Platforms and gatekeeper roles 
In most instances, platforms are treated as a given and as a static 'black 
box'. However, some recent platform literature has started to explore 
'platform (boundary) evolution' as a persistent characteristic of ICT platform 
markets (PARKER & VAN ALSTYNE, 2008; BOUDREAU, 2005). It has 
been convincingly argued that abstract and static conceptions of platforms 
need to be abandoned, and that research instead should concern itself with 
changing boundaries of platforms, both under the influence of discrete 
decisions of entry into a particular business and of incremental adaptations 
in relation to suppliers of complementary components.  
A related notion is the concept, coined in information and communication 
studies, of 'interface ambiguity', i.e. 'uncertainty in the market over what 
constitutes the key interface' (FUNK, 2002). There seem to be at least two 
aspects to interface ambiguity. Ambiguity may exist because it is not clear 
which of several well-defined interfaces within a general architecture will end 
up being the strategically most important one, which will lead to 'network 
centrality'. Ambiguity may also exist because a single key interface is not 
well defined, i.e. it is only vaguely circumscribed and alternative 
interpretations and incarnations exist in parallel. In this case, simultaneous 
and interdependent competition 'between' and 'within' (aspiring) standards 
may be expected. 
Based on the discussion in section two, it can be argued that the mobile 
communications industry, which is characterised by far-reaching 
technological as well as market convergence, currently not only deals with 
'platform evolution' and 'interface ambiguity', but a fortiori with platform 
ambiguity. This means that there is fundamental uncertainty not only about 
the boundaries and interfaces, but about the nature itself of a mobile service 
platform. It follows that network operators, handset vendors, software 
developers, application providers and so on all find themselves involved in 
direct platform competition. The implication is that what constitutes a 
platform in the mobile industry should not be taken as given, but that this 
concept rather should be opened up for closer scrutiny. The central 
questions then become: 
•  What are the core components around which platforms in this industry 
arise? and 
•  How to characterise differences between platforms in this industry? P. BALLON  21 
These questions will be addressed in the remaining sections of this 
paper. The notion of core components refers to the idea that some roles 
within a business configuration, as well as some functions in the technical 
architecture, carry more 'weight' than others, i.e. that they possess some 
characteristics, related to their position within the configuration, that endow 
them to play a structurally important role is (sometimes implicitly) present in 
several streams of academic literature. In areas such as transaction cost 
economics, anti-trust law, supply chain management, platform theory and 
design science, the concept of bottlenecks is well known. In these 
disciplines, bottlenecks are identified with the goal of optimising a system's 
behaviour, or of identifying the potential locus of competitive advantage cq. 
anti-competitive behaviour (see e.g. IANSITI & LEVIEN, 2004; REY & 
TIROLE, 2003; MORRIS & FERGUSON, 1993). Bottlenecks refer to scarce 
and critical resources. Bottleneck facilities are traditionally regarded as 
essential resources that are in fixed supply. In telecommunications, for 
instance, access to bottleneck facilities is prey to extensive regulation; in this 
context, bottlenecks are understood as a facility where the availability and/or 
terms of access fall below a benchmark or standard that has been deemed 
to be in the public interest (POEL & HAWKINS, 2001; TEECE, 1986). 
Related to this, bottlenecks are also associated with constraints on 
performance. BALDWIN & CLARK (2006) distinguish between two sorts of 
bottlenecks, i.e. absolute bottlenecks and fractional bottlenecks, depending 
on their impact on overall system performance. They suggest that successful 
firms are those that possess architectural knowledge about bottlenecks and 
use this knowledge in order to shrink their 'footprint' and selectively 
outsource activities. In this way, they gain an advantage in terms of invested 
capital, while keeping control over the most critical bottlenecks. 
Similarly, JACOBIDES et al. (2006) argue that bottlenecks not only drive 
the direction of innovative activity (by attracting focus to performance 
constraints), but also determine how an innovative combination creates and 
distributes value. Firms can beneﬁt from innovation by managing the 
industry's architecture carefully so they become the "bottlenecks" of their 
industry. JACOBIDES et al. envisage bottleneck ownership and exploitation 
in terms of 'architectural advantage', and define bottlenecks in a strategic 
way, i.e. as 'segments where mobility (both in terms of switching costs and 
potential entry) is limited and competition is softened'.  
Value chain analysis also acknowledges the existence of bottlenecks, 
and Porter's value chain concept incorporates the notion that firms owning a 
valuable part of the chain have incentives to try and close it off from 22     No. 75, 3
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competition and thereby turn it into a bottleneck (PORTER, 1985). However, 
it can be questioned whether (monetary) added value needs to be high, in 
order for some parts of value chains to possess an important architectural 
position. In (value) network analysis, the notion of hubs is added, i.e. the 
notion that a structurally strong position arises from a relatively large number 
of connections of a node - but this may be partly tautological, as it can also 
be claimed that a high number of connections will derive from a structurally 
strong position in the first place.  
Other explanations for structural or architectural advantage can be 
derived from platform theory. While most platform and two-sided market 
theory takes the existence and characteristics of a platform as a given, and 
focuses instead on stylising the relationships between platforms and their 
various customer constituencies, some authors have attempted to outline 
why platforms, in fact, become platforms. One answer is that they offer re-
usable components or shared functionality in industries where 
complementarity exists and thus are able to generate economies of scale 
(BRESNAHAN, 1999). However, this is probably true for almost every 
product or component, at least in the ICT domain, which has led to 
exclamations such as "everything is a platform!"  
Another common explanation of platform ownership lies in the ownership 
and specification of particular critical interfaces (GAWER & CUSUMANO, 
2002). Obviously, the question is then why interfaces arise at certain points. 
BALDWIN (2007) has provided an argument for this based on transaction 
cost theory. She conceptualises systems of production as task networks, in 
which "thin crossing points" and "thick crossing points" exist. She argues 
that interfaces tend to arise at "thin crossing points" within a task network. 
Thin crossing points are associated with low transaction costs, (e.g. the 
costs of defining, counting, and paying for things transferred) and with 
'information hiding' between the various stakeholders.  
The discussion above provides a number of concepts related to the 
notion of leveraging particular structurally or architecturally important 
positions. Yet, it can be argued that one additional concept is needed, which 
deals specifically with the nature of information exchange. This is in line with 
arguments from information and communication studies that purely 
'formalist' engineering approaches or 'reductionist' economic approaches, 
conceptualising communication processes as a flow of signals, respectively 
in terms of commodities being exchanged, fail to do justice to some of the 
essential properties of information, and obscure the consequences of 
information exchange (BABE, 1995).  P. BALLON  23 
Without denying that commoditisation of information does in fact take 
place on a large scale, it appears necessary to acknowledge the importance 
of qualitative transformations resulting from the accumulation, distribution 
and processing of information. Connecting this notion to the idea of 
controlling bottlenecks, the concept of gatekeeping functions and gatekeeper 
roles can be introduced. This concept joins the idea of a 'platform 
gatekeeper' (see e.g. FARRELL & WEISER, 2003; BAYE & MORGAN, 
2001), controlling access in modular or partly-modular systems, with the 
concept of (information) 'gatekeepers' (see e.g. SHOEMAKER, 1996; 
LEWIN, 1951), which is commonly used in media and communication 
studies to describe persons and organisations selecting and processing 
ideas and information. Included in this concept is the notion that 
(information) gatekeepers not only filter and select information (i.e. the 
gatekeeper acts as a bottleneck) but also qualitatively alter the informational 
content (for better or for worse) through active accumulation, processing and 
packaging (i.e. the gatekeeper adds 'value').  
In information and communication studies, the gatekeeper concept is 
usually taken as a given, and no in-depth discussion is offered of what 
functionalities specifically enable an entity to function as gatekeeper. The 
generic gatekeeper concept to specific information gathering, processing 
and filtering functionalities enables its owners to adopt a dominant position 
within the value network. In a context of 'platformisation' of the mobile 
industry, this would imply that gatekeeping functions and the associated 
gatekeeper roles are instrumental in strategies to open up information 
resources and thereby attract great numbers of customers, but at the same 
time allow to control and to lock in (at least to some extent) various types of 
customers.  
   Gatekeeper roles in mobile communications 
Are the platform strategies in the mobile industry in effect centred on the 
control of specific gatekeeper roles? Currently, various competing as well as 
highly diverging approaches to mobile service platforms can be observed in 
the market. Mobile service platform configurations range from modest, 
application-specific platforms to all-encompassing service development and 
deployment environments integrating low-level as well as high-level 
telecommunications and IT capabilities. In particular, entirely different 
'archetypical' platform architectures can be observed in the current mobile 24     No. 75, 3
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service provision market, i.e. resulting in 'telco-centric', 'device-centric', 
'aggregator-centric' and 'service-centric' business models. However, as the 
subsequent discussion of cases will illustrate, all of these models aim at the 
control of four crucial gatekeeper roles (see also BALLON et al., 2008; VAN 
BOSSUYT  et al., 2007): the service creation environment for third-party 
service developers; the profile and identity management component; the 
service brokerage (or portal) function; and the charging and billing modules.  
The first business model currently encountered can be labelled the telco-
centric model. This model has been common in the mobile industry for 
several years. A real-life example is the Vodafone Live! Platform. This model 
places the majority of roles within the domain of one real-life stakeholder, the 
telecom carrier, which acts as portal provider, service aggregator, network 
operator and platform operator. In this model, the user accesses services via 
a portal screen. The portal provider is incorporated in the network and 
platform operator. The platform operator provides technical tools to facilitate 
network access and portal provisioning. Service aggregation can also be 
carried out within the portal environment. These four actors in real life all 
coincide with the telecom carrier. The carrier typically makes specific and 
even exclusive deals with service providers and aggregators that can publish 
services on the portal. The user pays the carrier for access, and the carrier 
pays service providers for delivered services. 
Within this model, all four gatekeeper roles are owned and controlled by 
the network carrier, which performs the actor activities of platform operator, 
portal provider and network operator. Service Creation is not open to 
everyone. Whether services are made available on the portal is the result of 
specific negotiations with the mobile operator. Profile and Identity 
information is managed by the mobile network operator, as it knows the 
identity of the user accessing the network and can gather information on the 
user's activities on the portal. Service Brokerage is taken up by the mobile 
carrier. The carrier decides which service providers can create services for 
the portal. Concerning Charging and Billing, the customer has a direct billing 
relationship with the carrier for access to the network and to the portal. 
The second business model that can be discerned is the device-centric 
model. This is a model where the main service platform is incorporated in, or 
tied together with, the mobile device. A real-life example is the Apple iPhone 
offering. The introduction of the iPhone presented the industry with a number 
of business model innovations. In this model, the user purchases a device 
which offers several integrated services. The device manufacturer takes up 
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manufacturer offers mobile versions of services it already provides on other 
devices. The device is in some cases bundled with a subscription from a 
carrier.  
When analysing the configuration of the gatekeeper roles, it is clear that 
the device manufacturer in this model is shifting control over them away from 
the operator. Service Creation is open to any developer, but services have to 
be approved by the device manufacturer, and a revenue sharing deal exists 
between the manufacturer and the providers. Some Identity information 
resides with the network operator, but most Profile information is gathered 
by the device manufacturer, as he can access user activities on the device, 
i.e. content purchases. Concerning Service Brokerage, the device 
manufacturer keeps quite tight control on which applications and/or services 
can be placed on the device, e.g. through an applications store, thus 
brokering between service developers and end users. Related to Charging & 
Billing, the user is charged by the network operator for access, but pays 
directly to the device manufacturer for any third-party service.  
The third business model that can be distinguished is the aggregator-
centric model. A service portal is an obvious way to disclose services to a 
user, but this model takes it a step further, in the sense that the actor role of 
portal provider is taken over by a service aggregator independent of the 
mobile network operator. A real-life example is the Facebook Mobile 
platform. In this model, the user gains access to network via network 
operator. The service aggregator plays the role of portal provider, allowing 
the user to select individual services. The service aggregator is typically not 
bound to any specific network operator. The platform is operated by the 
service aggregator, who is defining the development language. The service 
developers create applications that can run on the portal. Some services can 
be accessed outside of portal, i.e. via the web browser. 
In this instance, Profile and Identity information is kept and monetised by 
the service aggregator, who is also acting as a Broker between the end user 
and individual applications. The advertising models and the associated 
revenue sharing mechanisms to be adopted in this model are at this moment 
still unclear. What is clear is that again, the platform owner is consciously 
attempting to control and shape the gatekeeper roles. While there is no tight 
control on the services that end up on the portal, and Service Creation is 
open to almost anyone without any authentication process from the 
aggregator, developers are still bound to the technical platform offered by 
the aggregator. The user has a direct Billing relationship with the network 
operator for access, but not necessarily with the service aggregator. 26     No. 75, 3
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Monetization in this particular model is not clear and can for example rely on 
advertising revenues, collected by the aggregator. 
Finally, the service centric model constitutes a more or less theoretical 
model for now. It is a.o. based on plans and models surrounding Google's 
Open Social initiative regarding open API's for social networking 
applications, including mobile applications. In this model, the user connects 
via the mobile network operator and selects services on a case-per-case 
basis. The service providers each operate a specific platform. A meta-
platform operator (e.g. Open Social) allows developers to link services 
together and exchange information. Services outside of the meta-platform 
are available, but not connected.  
This is a very open model in the sense that both service developers and 
users are free to choose whether they want to use any common platform 
functionality cq portal, or not. In terms of the implementation of the 
gatekeeper roles, these are less concentrated with one particular 
stakeholder than in previous models, but rather distributed over various 
individual service providers. Still, it is clear that Google counts on leveraging 
the profile data through the meta-tools that it offers to the individual service 
providers, and is intending Open Social to influence control over the 
gatekeeper roles that were identified. Service Creation is open to anyone, as 
there is no central platform, yet service developers wanting to make use of 
the meta-platform functionalities need to take into account compatibility with 
this actor. Profile and Identity information is managed by the individual 
service providers to which the end users subscribe, but is exchanged 
through the meta-platform. There is no central Brokering entity between 
service developers and end users, but some form of brokerage may reside 
with the meta-platform operator, allowing for interaction between different 
services. In terms of Charging and Billing, it needs to be highlighted that the 
monetisation models for this scenario have not crystallised in real life yet. 
There can be a direct billing relationship if a service developer charges the 
end user for access to the service, but advertisement-based models, 
facilitated by the meta-operator, are also very likely.  
As these cases have illustrated, platform competition is permeating the 
mobile service provision market. These platform strategies appear to be 
oriented towards control over four crucial gatekeeper roles. Emergent 
business models championed by non-operators focus on exposing 
capabilities and on offering service enablers through a platform, and on 
migrating control over the gatekeeper roles away from the operator. P. BALLON  27 
   Towards a typology of platforms 
While the previous section illustrated that highly diverging initiatives such 
as Vodafone Live!, the Apple iPhone, Facebook Mobile and Google's Open 
Social can be compared in terms of the gatekeeper roles they are attempting 
to control, it also demonstrated that they constitute very different types of 
platforms. This section will argue that current mobile platforms do not simply 
differ in terms of ownership (i.e. whether they are owned by a mobile 
operator, device manufacturer and so on), but also in terms of the additional 
roles that they integrate beyond the gatekeeper roles, and in terms of how 
they interact with customers at multiple sides of the platform. 
Fairly little attention has been devoted until now to the specific 
characteristics of, and differences between, several types of platforms. While 
a number of tentative conceptualisations of types of ICT platforms have 
been put forward in scholarly literature already, they do not appear suited to 
capture the types of platform models encountered in the mobile industry. 
SCHIFF (2003) distinguishes between a platform that delivers an active 
'matching service', and a platform that passively mediates. However, most of 
the mobile service platforms at the same time provide active matching 
services (e.g. through personalisation features) as passive mediation (e.g. 
through offering an SDK). 
EISENMANN (2007) identifies proprietary platforms, which have a single 
provider that individually controls its technology, and shared platforms, in 
which multiple firms collaborate in developing the platform's technology, and 
then compete by offering users different but compatible versions of the 
platform. However, various platforms discussed above can be characterised 
as hybrids, externalising mostly proprietary technologies, but at the same 
time incorporating open, standardised and/or shared functionalities. 
EVANS  et al. (2005) distinguish between matchmakers, which aid 
members of one or both sides in their quest for a match on the other side, 
audience-makers, which bring advertisers and audiences together, 
transaction-based businesses, which meter transactions between the two 
sides of a market, and shared-input platforms, which include hardware and 
software platforms where participants on at least one side need to obtain 
access to the platform to provide value to participants on at least one other 
side. But again, it can be argued that mobile service platforms may fulfil all 
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Returning to this paper's focus on control configurations, what does 
appear to distinguish the various types is the question whether control over 
assets is linked to control over customers. Platform leaders were equalled in 
this paper to actors controlling crucial gatekeeping roles. However, as the 
cases demonstrated, to control these roles does not necessarily mean that 
the platform owner also has control over the customer (i.e. end-user) 
relationship, or has control over all, or even most, assets needed to 
'assemble' the value proposition. In fact, it could be argued that it is even a 
central tenet of platform literature that these forms of control can and will to 
an extent reside outside of the platform (making the platform model 'open'), 
while the platform only monopolises control over the roles that bestow most 
'architectural advantage' (making the platform model 'open but not open'). 
Reinterpreting the business models currently employed in the mobile 
communications industry in this light, four basic platform types can be 
distinguished.  
Among the cases discussed in this paper, the IMS platform and the 
related network operator APIs that expose network functionalities such as 
voice or messaging to third party service providers, seem to constitute a sort 
of 'Enabler Platform'. This refers to the case where the platform owner 
controls many or most of the assets involved in mobile service provision, but 
leaves the customer relationship to third-party developers. In platform 
literature, Intel is a well-known example of such a mobile enabler platform.  
In the Vodafone Live! and the Apple iPhone case, which were also 
outlined earlier, many or most of the assets related to the value proposition, 
as well as the customer ownership, are in the hands of the platform owner. 
Still, this actor actively facilitates and encourages entry of 'third parties' to 
constitute a multi-sided market, e.g. by not 'squeezing' complementary 
actors out of the market. In other words, it allows competing service 
providers to use its platform, in order to increase the value of both this 
platform and its own end-user service offering. This second type of platform 
can be labelled a 'System Integrator Platform'. One typical example of such 
a platform model that has been often described in platform literature is 
Microsoft.  
Google's Open Social initiative constitutes a third type of platform, which 
keeps its distance from the eventual value proposition as well as from the 
customer relationship. This can be labelled a 'Neutral Platform'. It refers to 
the case in which the platform owner does not control most of the assets 
necessary for the value proposition (because apart from controlling the 
gatekeeper roles it has hardly any assets related to the value proposition P. BALLON  29 
itself), and on top of this does not have customer ownership (because it 
does not establish a billing relationship with the end-user and may be even 
invisible to the end-user). Another example of a neutral platform is Paypal or 
the LiMo platform.  
In the Facebook Mobile case, the platform relies on other actors that 
control many or even most of the assets for establishing the value 
proposition, but does integrate customer ownership. This fourth type could 
be labelled a 'Broker Platform'. Mobile web marketplaces such as GetJar are 
also examples of such a broker. Outside of the mobile industry, a dating club 
or eBay constitute examples of such a platform.  
In summary, the proposed platform typology, based on a number of 
control-related parameters and derived from the cases cited above, can be 
represented as follows: 
Table 1 - Typology of platform models 
  No control over customers  Control over customers 
Enabler Platform  System Integrator Platform 
The platform owner controls many of 
the necessary assets to ensure the 
value proposition, but does not 
control the customer relationship 
The platform owner controls many of the 
assets to ensure the value proposition, 
and establishes a relationship with end-
users. Entry of 'third-party' service 
providers is actively encouraged 
Control over 
Assets  
Examples: IMS, Intel   Examples: iPhone, MS 
Neutral Platform  Broker Platform 
The platform owner is strongly 
reliant on the assets of other actors 
to create the value proposition, and 
does not control the customer 
relationship 
The platform owner is strongly reliant on 
the assets of other actors to create the 




Examples: Open Social, PayPal  Example: Facebook Mobile, dating clubs 
Naturally, this typology needs to be further refined and validated. 
However, on the basis of the analysis presented here it can be suggested 
that it may serve to operationalise various forms of control leading to 
different platform models, to explore the different characteristics of the 
platform types and to link these to various outcomes in terms of value being 
created for service developers as well as for end users.  30     No. 75, 3
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   Conclusion 
The European mobile industry is being shaken up under the influence of 
technological and market convergence. This paper argued that 
platformisation is increasingly and structurally affecting the business models 
governing this industry. The dominant stakeholders in mobile service 
provision, i.e. mobile network operators, have been confronted with 
limitations when trying to attract users and service developers to their 
platform due to a walled garden approach. Emergent platform business 
models championed by other types of actors focus on exposing capabilities 
and on offering service enablers in a more open manner, while migrating 
control over some, or all, of the gatekeeper roles away from the operator. 
It was argued that the mobile industry currently is not only faced with 
platform evolution and interface ambiguity, but a fortiori with platform 
ambiguity, and that as a result, very different types of platforms and platform 
strategies are being introduced. These do not simply differ in terms of 
ownership (i.e. whether they are owned by a mobile operator, device 
manufacturer and so on), but also in terms of the additional roles that they 
integrate beyond the gatekeeper roles, and in terms of how they interact with 
customers at multiple sides of the platform. The various platform types were 
characterised as enabler, system integrator, neutral or broker models, 
dependent on the platform owner's control over assets on the one hand, and 
its control over the customer relationship on the other hand. 
To which extent these findings related to the platformisation of the mobile 
industry are comforting or discomforting is really in the eye of the beholder. 
In any case, what can be already indicated, is that the abundance and 
commoditisation created by platform models on the different sides of the 
multi-sided platform will as a rule be accompanied by strategies of control 
and scarcity around gatekeeper roles, regardless of the type of actor 
controlling the platform. This should at least temper any illusions about the 
completely open nature of competition in the 'mobile internet' world. It also 
implies that policy makers and regulators should not take for granted that 
simply allowing and facilitating the influx of IT and internet services and 
technologies will result in an unbundled, open mobile marketplace in which 
competition will flourish. Rather, platform business models are bound to 
arise that may again trigger regulatory concerns, and that, if the archetypical 
Microsoft platform is anything to go by, may even prove to be harder to 
delineate and to regulate than the current telecommunications market.  P. BALLON  31 
References 
BABE, R. (1995): Communication and the Transformation of Economics: Essays in 
Information, Public Policy, and Political Economy. Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press. 
BALDWIN, C. (2007): "Where do transactions come from? Modularity, transactions, 
and the boundaries of firms", Industrial and Corporate Change, December 2007, 1-
41. 
BALDWIN, C. & K. CLARK (2006): "Architectural Innovation and Dynamic 
Competition: The Smaller "Footprint" Strategy", HBS Working Paper 07-14. 
BALLON, P.: 
- (2009): Control and Value in Mobile Communications: A political economy of the 
reconfiguration of business models in the European mobile industry, Ph.D. thesis, 
Vrije Universiteit Brussel, online at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper=1331439.  
- (2007a): "Changing Business Models for Europe's Mobile Industry: The Impact of 
Alternative Wireless Technologies", Telematics and Informatics, 24, 3 (Aug 2007), 
192-205.  
- (2007b): "Business Modelling Revisited: The Configuration of Control and Value", 
INFO: The Journal of Policy, Regulation and Strategy for Telecommunications, 
Information and Media, 9, 5 (August 2007), 6-19. 
BALLON, P., WALRAVENS, N., SPEDALIERI, A. & C. VENEZIA (2008): "Towards 
Platform Business Models for Mobile Network Operators", Proceedings of the 19
th 
European Regional ITS Conference, Rome, Italy, 18-20 September. 
BAYE, M.R. & J. MORGAN (2001): "Information Gatekeepers on the Internet and the 
Competitiveness of Homogeneous Product Markets", American Economic Review, 
91, 454-474. 
BOHLIN, E. & J.C. BURGELMAN (2004): "Mobile Futures - beyond 3G", INFO: The 
Journal of Policy, Regulation and Strategy for Telecommunications, Special Issue, 6 
(6). 
BOUDREAU, K. (2005): "The Boundaries of the Platform: Vertical Integration and 
Economic Incentives in Mobile Computing", MIT Sloan Research Paper 4565-05.  
BRESNAHAN, T. (1999): "New Modes of Competition and the Future Structure of the 
Computer Industry", in: EISENACH, J. & T. LENARD (Eds), Competition, Innovation, 
and the Microsoft Monopoly, Berlin: Springer. 
EISENMANN, T. (2007): "Managing Proprietary and Shared Platforms: A Life-Cycle 
View", Harvard Business School Technology & Operations Management Unit, 
Research Paper No. 07-105, 27 June.  
ERNST, D. (2005): "Limits to Modularity: Reflections on Recent Developments in 
Chip Design", Industry and Innovation, Vol. 12, No. 3, 303-335, September 2005, 
303-335. 32     No. 75, 3
rd Q. 2009 
EVANS, D., HAGIU, A. & R. SCHMALENSEE (2005): "A Survey of the Economic 
Role of Software Platforms in Computer-based Industries", CESifo Economic 
Studies, Vol. 51, 2-3/2005, 189-224. 
FARRELL, J. & P. WEISER (2003): "Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open 
Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet 
Age", Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, Vol. 17, 1, Fall 2003. 
FUNK, J. (2002): Global Competition Between and Within Standards: The Case of 
Mobile Phones, Palgrave MacMillan. 
GAWER, A. (2009): "Platform Dynamics and Strategies: From Products to Services", 
In GAWER, A. (Ed.), Platforms, Markets and Innovation, Cheltenham, UK and 
Northampton, MA, US: Edward Elgar. 
GAWER, A. & M. CUSUMANO (2002): Platform Leadership: How Intel, Microsoft, 
and Cisco Drive Industry Innovation, Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
HAWKINS, R. (2003): "Looking beyond the .com bubble: exploring the form and 
function of business models in the electronic marketplace", in BOUWMAN, H., 
PREISSL, B. & C. STEINFELD (Eds), E-life after the Dot-com bust, Berlin: Springer. 
JACOBIDES, M., KNUDSEN, T. & M. AUGIER (2006): "Beneﬁting from innovation: 
Value creation, value appropriation and the role of industry architectures", Research 
Policy, 35 (2006) 1200-1221. 
JOAKAR, A. & T. FISH (2006): Mobile Web 2.0: The innovator's guide to developing 
and marketing next generation wireless/mobile applications, London, UK: Futuretext.  
KENNEDY, D. (2007): "The future Internet is starting now", NEM Letter, 7 December 
2007,  
LEWIN, K. (1951): Field Theory in Social Science: Selected theoretical papers 
(D. Cartwright, Ed.), New York: Harper Torchbooks. 
LINDMARK, S., BOHLIN, E. & E. ANDERSSON (2004): "Japan's mobile internet 
success story - facts, myths, lessons and implications", Info, Vol. 6, 6, 348-358. 
MANSELL, R. (1993): The New Telecommunications: A Political Economy of 
Network Evolution, London et al.: Sage Publications. 
MARTIKAINEN, O. (2006): "Internet Revolution in Telecom", IEEE Computer 
Society, International Symposium on Modern Computing (JVA'06). 
MORRIS, C.R., FERGUSON, C.H. (1993): "How architecture wins technology wars", 
Harvard Business Review (March-April), 86-96. 
PARKER, G. & M. VAN ALSTYNE (2008): "Innovation, Openness, and Platform 
Control", Working Paper, 24 July. Available online http://ssrn.com/abstract=1079712  P. BALLON  33 
POEL, M. & R. HAWKINS (2001): "The evolution of access bottlenecks in Europe: 




- (2001): "Strategy and the Internet", Harvard Business Review, 79 (March 2001), 62-
78. 
- (1985): Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance, 
New York: Free Press. 
RAPPA, M. (2001): Managing the digital enterprise- Business models on the Web, 
online at http://digitalenterprise.org/models/models.html 
REY, P. & J. TIROLE (2003): "A Primer on Foreclosure", in: ARMSTRONG, M. & R. 
PORTER (Eds), Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 3, Amsterdam: North-
Holland. 
SCHIFF, A. (2003): "Open and Closed systems of Two-sided Networks", Information 
Economics and Policy, 15 (December 2003), 425-442. 
SHOEMAKER, P. (1996): "Media Gatekeeping", in: SALWEN, M. & D. STACKS 
(Eds), An Integrated Approach to Communication Theory and Research, Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, 79- 92. 
TEE, R. (2005): "Different directions in the mobile internet: Analysing mobile internet 
services in Japan and Europe", in: HAMILL, L. & A. LASEN (Eds), Mobile World: 
Past, Present and Future, Springer, 143-160.  
TEECE, D.J. (1986): "Proﬁting from technological innovation: implications for 
integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy", Research Policy, 15, 285-305. 
VAN BOSSUYT, M., BALLON, P., GALLI, L., SPEDALIERI, A. & J. ROVIRA (2007): 
"Cross-case Analysis of the User Value Proposition for Next-Generation Mobile 
Service Platforms", Proceedings of the IST Mobile and Wireless Summit 2007, 
Budapest, 1-5 July 2007.  
ZITTRAIN, J. (2008): The Future of the Internet - And How to Stop It, New Haven & 
London: Yale University Press. 
 
 
 
 